Syndrome decoding of Reed-Muller codes and tensor decomposition over finite fields

Reed-Muller codes are some of the oldest and most widely studied error-correcting codes, of interest for both their algebraic structure as well as their many algorithmic properties. A recent beautiful result of Saptharishi, Shpilka and Volk showed that for binary Reed-Muller codes of length $n$ and distance $d = O(1)$, one can correct $\operatorname{polylog}(n)$ random errors in $\operatorname{poly}(n)$ time (which is well beyond the worst-case error tolerance of $O(1)$). In this paper, we consider the problem of `syndrome decoding' Reed-Muller codes from random errors. More specifically, given the $\operatorname{polylog}(n)$-bit long syndrome vector of a codeword corrupted in $\operatorname{polylog}(n)$ random coordinates, we would like to compute the locations of the codeword corruptions. This problem turns out to be equivalent to a basic question about computing tensor decomposition of random low-rank tensors over finite fields. Our main result is that syndrome decoding of Reed-Muller codes (and the equivalent tensor decomposition problem) can be solved efficiently, i.e., in $\operatorname{polylog}(n)$ time. We give two algorithms for this problem: 1. The first algorithm is a finite field variant of a classical algorithm for tensor decomposition over real numbers due to Jennrich. This also gives an alternate proof for the main result of Saptharishi et al. 2. The second algorithm is obtained by implementing the steps of the Berlekamp-Welch-style decoding algorithm of Saptharishi et al. in sublinear-time. The main new ingredient is an algorithm for solving certain kinds of systems of polynomial equations.Comment: 24 page

A Spectral Bound on Hypergraph Discrepancy

Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a $t$-regular hypergraph on $n$ vertices and $m$ edges. Let $M$ be the $m \times n$ incidence matrix of $\mathcal{H}$ and let us denote $\lambda =\max_{v \perp \overline{1},\|v\| = 1}\|Mv\|$. We show that the discrepancy of $\mathcal{H}$ is $O(\sqrt{t} + \lambda)$. As a corollary, this gives us that for every $t$, the discrepancy of a random $t$-regular hypergraph with $n$ vertices and $m \geq n$ edges is almost surely $O(\sqrt{t})$ as $n$ grows. The proof also gives a polynomial time algorithm that takes a hypergraph as input and outputs a coloring with the above guarantee.Comment: 18 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1811.01491, several changes to the presentatio

On the List Recoverability of Randomly Punctured Codes

We show that a random puncturing of a code with good distance is list recoverable beyond the Johnson bound. In particular, this implies that there are Reed-Solomon codes that are list recoverable beyond the Johnson bound. It was previously known that there are Reed-Solomon codes that do not have this property. As an immediate corollary to our main theorem, we obtain better degree bounds on unbalanced expanders that come from Reed-Solomon codes

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences

Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972), Knuth (1976) and Pittel (1989) proved that in balanced random matching markets, the proposers are matched to their $\ln n$th choice on average. In this paper, we consider markets where agents have partial (truncated) preferences, that is, the proposers only rank their top $d$ partners. Despite the long history of the problem, the following fundamental question remained unanswered: \emph{what is the smallest value of $d$ that results in a perfect stable matching with high probability?} In this paper, we answer this question exactly -- we prove that a degree of $\ln^2 n$ is necessary and sufficient. That is, we show that if $d < (1-\epsilon) \ln^2 n$ then no stable matching is perfect and if $d > (1+ \epsilon) \ln^2 n$, then every stable matching is perfect with high probability. This settles a recent conjecture by Kanoria, Min and Qian (2021). We generalize this threshold for unbalanced markets: we consider a matching market with $n$ agents on the shorter side and $n(\alpha+1)$ agents on the longer side. We show that for markets with $\alpha =o(1)$, the sharp threshold characterizing the existence of perfect stable matching occurs when $d$ is $\ln n \cdot \ln \left(\frac{1 + \alpha}{\alpha + (1/n(\alpha+1))} \right)$. Finally, we extend the line of work studying the effect of imbalance on the expected rank of the proposers (termed the ``stark effect of competition''). We establish the regime in unbalanced markets that forces this stark effect to take shape in markets with partial preferences